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Second Generation Law and Economics
of Conflict of Laws: Baxter's
Comparative Impairment and Beyond
William H. Allen* and Erin A. O'Hara**
In his 1963 article in the Stanford Law Review, "Choice of Law and the
Federal System," Professor William F. Baxter criticized the choice-of-law ap-
proach of the First Restatement of the Conflict of Laws. According to the Re-
statement, courts should apply the law of the state where the last act or event
deemed necessary to create a cause of action occurred. In contrast, Baxter ad-
vocated a comparative-impairment approach, whereby judges were obligated to
apply the law of the state whose public policy would suffer the greatest impair-
ment if its law was not applied. The authors contend that although Baxter's
approach caries intuitive appeal for one interested in economic theory, avail-
able empirical evidence and public choice insights together indicate that Bax-
ter's approach cannot work efficiently in practice. Because judges in practice
have neither the data nor the intuitive understanding of the complexities of any
legal problem to make the comparative-impairment determination in the scru-
pulous way that Baxter suggested, William H. Allen and Professor Erin A.
O'Hara recommend a modified Restatement approach. They believe an ap-
proach that keeps the basic concepts of the Restatement but modifies rules that
have not worked well in practice will generate greater predictability and less
bias in decisionmaking.
A choice-of-law rule is an empty and bloodless thing.1
Asked to name the great conflict of laws scholars of our century, one
might think of Beale, Goodrich, Lorenzen, Yntema, Ehrenzweig, Walter
Wheeler Cook, Willis Reese, David Cavers, Robert Leflar, Brainerd Currie
and several from among a dozen or so who have been active in the last thirty
or forty years. Narrowing this list to the few truly influential choice-of-law
scholars would surely leave Joseph Henry Beale and his antagonist, Brainerd
* L.L.B. 1956, Stanford Law School; member of the District of Columbia Bar; retired partner,
Covington & Burling.
** Visiting Associate Professor, Georgetown University Law Center, and Associate Professor,
George Mason University School of Law. Professor O'Hara received generous research support for
this article from the Law and Economics Center, George Mason University. Both authors wish to
thank Allen Dudley, Jr., for valuable research assistance.
1. BRAINERD CURPE, On Displacement of the Law of the Forum, reprinted in SELECTED
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3, 52 (1963) (hereinafter SELECTED ESSAYS].
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Currie. Leflar and perhaps one or two of the others would almost surely also
remain, and very likely an outsider, William F. Baxter, would join them on
that select list. Unlike the others named, Bill Baxter was not what Professor
Lea Brilmayer, referring to conflicts scholars, would have called a "card-
carrying member of this wild-eyed community of intellectual zealots."2
Baxter's academic career was not devoted wholly or even in major part to
conflicts; he wrote no treatise or series of articles elaborating his views on
choice of law.
Baxter published but one article on the subject. It was his first signed
scholarly work,3 written when he was an associate professor at Stanford Law
School-his academic home throughout his career-and published in the
Stanford Law Review in 1963. 4 Thirty-five years later, the Baxter article is
refreshingly different from much modem legal scholarship. It is written in
English, sparely but clearly and with style, and is accessible to anyone capa-
ble of following reasoned argument. More importantly, that single article
has been cited scores of times,5 is described in probably every American con-
flict of laws textbook,6 and has been incorporated into the choice-of-law ap-
proach of at least one state, California.7 If anything, modem choice-of-law
scholarship continues to gravitate toward Baxter's ideas,8 something that
cannot be said of Beale or, perhaps, even of Currie.
The article was the product of an extraordinarily incisive, fertile legal
mind brought to bear on a subject that Baxter was made to think about by the
demands of a teaching assignment. At least in those distant days, young
members of the Stanford Law School faculty taught whatever needed to be
2. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS, at xiii
(1991).
3. The qualifier, "signed," is used deliberately. When Baxter was a student at the Stanford
Law School, student work in the Stanford Law Review was not signed. He was, however, the
author of Comment, Interlocutory Orders "Refusing" Injunctions, 7 STAN. L. REV. 549 (1955).
Furthermore, every student comment in volume 8 of the Review bears a heavy imprint of Baxter's
editing. One of us can attest to these propositions from first-hand observation.
4. William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. I (1963).
5. A Westlaw database search conducted in the fall of 1998 revealed 138 different law review
articles in which Baxter's article has been cited just since 1981.
6. See, e.g., ROGER C. CRAMTON, DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMA HILL KAY & LARRY KRAMER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 194 (5th ed. 1993); MAURICE ROSENBERG,
PETER HAY & RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 690 (10th
ed. 1996); GARY J. SIMSON, ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 178 (3d ed. 1997).
7. See, e.g., Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978); Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 781, 783 (N.H.
1966) (comparing relative impairment of purposes behind states' laws).
8. In the last decade, several conflicts scholars have focused on states' bargaining, real or hy-
pothetical, to generate rules that can, in the aggregate, further each state's policy interests. See, e.g.,
BRILMAYER, supra note 2, at 145-89; Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 277, 315-44 (1990); Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of
Government Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975, 1017-22 (1994).
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taught. Thus, in the early years of his academic career, Bill Baxter taught
conflicts along with administrative law, admiralty, agency, federal jurisdic-
tion, persons (as Stanford called the domestic relations course), practice, and
the business of the Supreme Court. The article grew out of his teaching, as
indicated by its first sentence: "After attempting for several years to teach
the rules devised for the resolution of choice-of-law problems, I have con-
cluded that those rules do not yield satisfactory results." 9
The rules in 1963 were everywhere, or almost everywhere, the rules that
Joseph Beale, as reporter for the Restatement of Conflict of Laws (First Re-
statement) and author of a contemporaneous three-volume treatise, 10 had un-
dertaken to state and to underpin intellectually." The rules related to where
events occurred or things were. If an automobile accident happened or a
contract was concluded or a piece of real property was located in a particular
state, only the law of that state was pertinent to any ensuing tort or contract
or quiet-title acion.
As Baxter acknowledged, he was not the first critic of these rules.12
Criticism began almost as soon as the First Restatement was adopted and the
treatise published. When Baxter's article appeared in December 1963, the
most prolific of the critics, Brainerd Currie, had just published an extraordi-
nary collection of law review articles that he had written in the preceding few
years.' 3 In them Currie did not merely criticize. He offered a coherent
global alternative to the "conceptualistic" (a term of opprobrium for those
schooled in legal realism) rules of the First Restatement.'4 His alternative
not only appealed to his fellow scholars but also found favor with judges, the
essential audience for one who would reform common law doctrine.
Currie offered "interest analysis" as the basis for choice of law, and
Baxter began his article by following Currie's lead. He agreed with Currie
that analysis should begin by discerning which state or states, if any, had
genuine policy interests at stake in the resolution of a multistate dispute.
One of Currie's central insights was that many cases thought to pose an issue
that could superficially be characterized as a conflict of laws in fact involved
no conflict. These were in fact false conflicts because only one of the juris-
dictions arguably interested in the dispute had a genuine interest in the appli-
9. Baxter, supra note 4, at 1.
10. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWs (1934) [hereinafter FIRST RESTATEMENT]; JOSEPH
H. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAWs (1935).
11. See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS, at xxviii (4th ed.
1995) (noting that Beale's theory "appeared for a time to be headed for apotheosis by the United
States Supreme Court as a branch of the law of due process").
12. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 1.
13. In a footnote, Baxter listed thirteen articles and one book review that Currie wrote or co-
wrote in the period 1958-1963 (most in 1958 and 1959). See Baxter, supra note 4, at 6 n.13. These
and others vere collected in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 1.
14. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 10.
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cation of its law. Currie recognized that his central insight did not account
for all the cases. Some cases posed a real conflict, where two or more states
with arguable interests in a matter had genuine interests. For these cases,
Currie proposed application of the law of the forum. Baxter parted company
with Currie at this point. To Baxter, the application of forum law in a true-
conflict case was just as arbitrary as any of the First Restatement rules, and it
would invite forum shopping and produce other evils. 15
In an effort to resolve the case of the true conflict more satisfactorily,
Baxter asked an important, but until then overlooked, choice-of-law ques-
tion: How can fifty states choose what law to apply in multistate cases so as
to maximize their varying substantive policies? Though it might not have
been so characterized at the time,16 this is quintessentially a law and eco-
nomics question. Stated more generally, the question is what social policy
will maximize utility across the individuals or entities affected by the prob-
lem at which the policy is aimed.' 7 Baxter concluded that true conflicts
should be resolved by applying the law of the state whose policies would be
most impaired by application of the other state's law. By engaging in this
"comparative-impairment" analysis, courts could maximize the joint effec-
tuation of states' policies.
Many early law and economics scholars attempted to answer this type of
question without adequately considering the costs, political and otherwise,
associated with public policy decisionmaking. But Baxter was keenly aware
of the difficulty, if not futility, of asking fifty self-interested states' courts to
coordinate their choice-of-law policies to their joint benefit. The last half of
his forty-two-page article is devoted to an elegant argument that the federal
courts should interpret the Full Faith and Credit Clause and use their diver-
sity jurisdiction to foster comparative-impairment analysis as the basis for
choice of law.' 8 It is fair to say that this part of the article, though of con-
15. See id. at 9-10.
16. The Journal of Law and Economics had begun publication only five years earlier, in 1958.
The first edition of Posner's Economic Analysis of Law would not appear until 1972. Baxter him-
self first taught by name a course that heavily implicated economics--"Regulated Industries"--in
1963-1964 (although he told one of the authors that his administrative law course, which he began
teaching in his first year on the faculty, had become increasingly concerned with the economically
inefficient policies of the economic regulatory agencies of that time, so that "Regulated Industries"
was more a change of name than a new course). He first taught the antitrust course, styled "Gov-
ernent Regulation of Business," in 1966.
17. Describing hypothetical bargaining between states about which state's law would apply,
Baxter wrote that "the final agreement would approximate maximum utility to each." Baxter, supra
note 4, at 7.
18. Baxter taught federal jurisdiction and had had a particular interest in the subject since his
student days. A faculty member told Baxter of the then-novel Hart and Wechsler casebook. Baxter
soon asked for, and received, a copy as a birthday present. He read the book in the summer be-
tween his second and third years in law school. In his third year, he organized a series of seminars
on sections of The Federal Courts and the Federal System, inviting a few students and faculty
members to participate.
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tinuing intellectual interest,19 has had no influence. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause has become no more demanding in choice-of-law cases. Klaxon Co.
v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co. 20 has not been overruled (as Baxter
urged). Thus, a federal district court in a diversity case that poses a choice-
of-law issue still must decide the case just as the state court in the courthouse
across the street would. With the advantage of hindsight, Baxter's proposal
seems utterly unrealistic and, even in 1963, must have seemed more hopeful
than practical.
It is our thesis that the knowledge that federal judges would not step into
the breach and a more refined understanding of the public choice and other
economics problems involved in fashioning a rational choice-of-law system
for a federal republic of fifty sovereign states might have led a later Baxter
toward, if not quite to, the very First Restatement choice-of-law rules that
had frustrated him in his teaching. We support this thesis by using insights
into choice of law that Baxter elucidated.
In Part I, we examine in some greater detail the rules of the First Re-
statement and the reasons that Baxter and others found them so unsatisfac-
tory. In Part II, we elaborate our description of Currie's interest analysis and
Baxter's refinement of it. In Part I, we discuss some of the flaws of interest
analysis that have appeared in its application. In Part IV, we conclude that
Baxter's refinement would not effectively cure these flaws, and finally in
Part V, we offer some alternative ideas for a choice-of-law system that we
hope would have had some appeal to Bill Baxter, that most incisive and ob-
jective of critics.
I. THE FIRSTRESTATEMENT AND ITS CRITICS
The First Restatement embodied the traditional approach to choice of
law, which at one point was followed in all fifty states.21 The First Restate-
ment contained a set of rules derived from two interrelated formalistic con-
cepts. The first was the "territoriality" of states' powers: Each state con-
trolled the people and events within its borders, but no state controlled peo-
ple or events outside of its borders.22 Of course, some disputes involve peo-
ple and events that span state lines; consequently, exclusive territoriality re-
quired a more refined allocation of state powers. This refinement came from
the second concept embodied in the traditional approach, "vested rights."
According to the vested rights "theory," articulated by Joseph Beale, in-
dividual rights vest, if at all, at only one place and one point in time. Rights
19. See BRILIAYER, supra note 11, at 716-17; ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 6, at 692-93.
20. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21. See BRiuLMAYER, supra note 11, at 1 (acknowledging that the territorial approach "once
represented the universal American approach to choice of law").
22. See I BEALE, supra note 10, §§ 2.1, 5.2.
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typically vested with the occurrence of one particular act or event, and the
substantive law of the state in which the vesting act occurred governed any
dispute engendered by an alleged violation of that right. Only the vesting
state's substantive laws provided a remedy. Any other state that entertained
a lawsuit must therefore apply the vesting state's substantive law to the dis-
pute.23
In general, a right vested in the state where the last act or event deemed
necessary to create the cause of action occurred. In tort cases, it was the law
of the place of injury that applied.24 For contracts, the law of the state where
a contract was concluded governed the validity of the contract and the sub-
stantial obligations of the parties,2 5 while the law of the place of performance
governed minor details of performance.2 6 In the case of real property, states
applied the law of the situs of the property.27 Specific First Restatement
rules determined the choice of law for a wide variety of legal issues, includ-
ing corporate shareholders' liabilities,28 administration of decedents' es-
tates,29 entitlement to workmen's compensation, 30 and determination of
marital status.31 The rules, taken together, promised certainty and therefore
predictability in the resolution of choice-of-law issues.32
During the three decades that followed its publication, however, the First
Restatement was subjected to severe scholarly criticism.3 3 Beginning about
the time Baxter wrote of his own and others' 4 dissatisfaction with the First
Restatement rules, individual states increasingly rejected them as well.35
Concerns about the First Restatement's rules fell principally into two catego-
ries. The first was a widespread criticism that, despite Beale's attempt to
23. See BRILMAYER, supra note 2, at 19-20.
24. See FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 377.
25. See id. § 332.
26. See id. § 358.
27. See id. §§ 216-251.
28. See id. §§ 185-191.
29. See id. §§ 465-524.
30. See id. §§ 398-403.
31. See id. §§ 121-136.
32. Cf. HERBERT F. GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 92, at 261-62 (3d
ed. 1949) (application of a law other than that dictated by the First Restatement "would impose a
criterion that would not have been foreseen by at least one of the two parties to the suit").
33. See generally WALTER WHEELER COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAwS (1942); SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 1; Fowler V. Harper, Policy Bases of
the Conflict of Laws: Reflections on Rereading Professor Lorenzen 's Essays, 56 YALE L.J. 1155
(1947); Roger J. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230.
34. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 (noting that "[m]any more experienced writers appar-
ently agree with [my] evaluation," citing Walter Wheeler Cook, David Cavers, Brainerd Currie, and
Justice Roger Traynor).
35. For a description of criticisms of the First Restatement that eventually led to the rejection
of the First Restatement rules by the states, see BRILMAYER, supra note I 1,'at 201-03.
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supply it, the rules lacked any coherent normative underpinning.36 Even if
one assumed that the rules led to certain and predictable choices of law, that
virtue was thought not to be sufficient justification for a legal rule. As Bax-
ter pointed out, any choice rule, "uniformly adopted and applied," would
serve the desirable objective of predictability. 37 Indeed, that is true not just
of choice of law, but of any legal rules. The question that remains is what
the content of any legal rule should be. The vested rights approach focused
on the "last act necessary" to give rise to a cause of action, but there ap-
peared to be nothing inherently right about choosing the last act for choice-
of-law purposes, as opposed to any other significant fact relevant to the inci-
dent, transaction or status of the parties.3 To conflicts scholars, the rules
seemed largely arbitrary, indeed counterintuitive. 39
Second, for a variety of reasons, the First Restatement rules did not seem
even to yield the certainty and predictability advocated as their virtue. Bax-
ter asserted that, "[a]s means to the end of predictability," these rules "are
vulnerable to attack, not because they are too rigid, but because they are not
rigid enough." 40 For example, a court was required to look at the place of
execution of a contract to determine the validity of that contract, but deter-
mining the "place of execution" is subject to the uncertain applications of the
law of offer and acceptance. "When, and therefore where, binding agree-
ment occurred is often debatable." 41
Beyond that, there is the problem of characterization. For example, all
choice-of-law systems agree that issues of procedure are governed by the law
of the forum; only issues of substantive law are subject to choice-of-law
36. "Only the lawyer, specially disadvantaged by his professional training, could assert as an
original proposition that a contract case ought to be decided according to the law of the place where
the contract was made or that a tort case ought to be decided by the law of the place of injury."
Baxter, supra note 4, at 2.
37. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 3.
38. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness, " and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191,
1197 (1987) (describing Walter Wheeler Cook's critique of traditional choice-of-law rules).
39. See CURRIE, supra note 1, at 6 ("Walter Wheeler Cook discredited the vested-rights the-
ory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the intellectual product of an-
other."); id. at 12 (noting that Professor Nussbaum's proposed solution "'furnishes another point
against the vested right doctrine') (citation omitted); CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication
versus Automation in the Conflict of Laws, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note I, at 128,
158 (arguing that "while it sometimes makes sense to apply the law of the place of the wrong with
respect to some questions, it makes no sense whatever to apply the lav of the place of the wrong
concerning survival in [certain) fact situation[s]") (citation omitted); CURRIE, Married Women's
Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note I, at
77, 116 (characterizing his proposed solutions as "not choice-of-law rules in the traditional
sense.... They do not say directly what law shall govern. They simply say that a particular law is
intended to govern in certain cases. It seems to me that there are advantages in this way of stating
conflict-of-laws rules") (citation omitted).
40. Baxter, supra note 4, at 3.
41. Id. at 4; see also id. at 4 n.8 (citing examples).
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rules.42 The initial characterization of an issue as procedural or substantive
can thus be determinative. But, of course, one of the earliest truisms that a
law student learns is that the line between the procedural and the substantive
wavers. Moreover, even within the realm of the undoubtedly substantive,
characterization of a dispute often precedes analysis. In a dispute over real
property that was the subject of a contract, a court could treat the case either
as a property case, and thus apply the law of the situs of the property, or as a
contract case and look to the place where the contract was made.43 And so of
cases at the margin between tort and contract, 4 and cases that might be said
either to involve substantial contractual duties or to concern mere details of
contractual performance.45 If the invitations to judicial manipulation inher-
ent in the uncertainty and ambiguity of application of the rules were not
enough, a court could sometimes. straightforwardly justify an unwillingness
to apply any law other than its own on the ground that sister-state law of-
fended the public policy of the forum.46
Critics suggested that courts manipulated or escaped from the supposed
rigors of the First Restatement rules as often as they did for the very reason
that the normative criteria of those rules had no intellectual grounding.47
Since judges were already covertly basing their actual choice-of-law deci-
sions on criteria not reflected in the First Restatement rules, why not per-
mit-or require-the judges to do so explicitly?48 A number of substitute
normative choice-of-law criteria have been proposed and some have been
42. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.8, at 58-59 & n.2 (2d ed.
1992) (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42
YALE L.J. 333, 344 (1933) and Aaron D. Twerski & Renee G. Mayer, Toward a Pragmatic Solu-
tion of Choice-of-Law Problems-At the Interface of Substance and Procedure, 74 Nwv. U. L. REV.
781,784 (1979)).
43. See BRILMAYER, supra note 11, at 124-25 (noting the general problem of characterization
and the unsatisfactory resolution of this problem by the First Restatement).
44. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 42, § 3.4 (discussing the difficulty of characterizing a case as
either tort or contract, citing several cases).
45. Cf. FIRST RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 358 cmt. b (noting that "no logical line" sepa-
rates the two types of contract issues).
46. See Paul v. National Life, 352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986) (refusing to enforce automobile
guest passenger statutes of other states, because they violated West Virginia public policy); Bethle-
hem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zamas & Co., 498 A.2d 605 (Md. 1985) (refusing to enforce a contractual
clause providing for the indemnity against the results of one's sole negligence, because it violated
Maryland public policy); see also Comment, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 275, 278 (1955).
47. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 2, § 1.4 (noting that the system treated the nature of
laws as though they were "fixed concepts of eternal truth"); CURRIE, Notes on Methods and Objec-
tives in the Conflict of Laws, reprinted in SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note I, at 177, 180-81 (enumer-
ating some irrational elements of the conflict of laws doctrine).
48. "The court is not idly choosing a law; it is determining a controversy." GENE R. SHREVE,
A CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ANTHOLOGY 55 (1997) (citing David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of
Law Problem, 47 HARV. L .REV. 173, 189 (1933)).
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adopted by one or more states. 49 We concentrate here on Currie's interest
analysis and Baxter's refinement of it because Baxter's scholarly work is the
focus of this symposium and because Currie's interest analysis is widely
used in American courts, even courts that profess to follow the amorphous
directions of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (Second Restate-
ment). Under the Second Restatement, a court decides which state has the
most significant contact with an incident or dispute and applies its law.50
This approach is the favorite of scholars and judges who delight in the large
measure of judicial discretion that results when judges are asked to catalog
and weigh a number of usually incommensurable factors. We deal with it
and other regimes only glancingly in this article.
II. INTEREST ANALYSIS AND BAXTER'S REFINEMENT
Brainerd Currie, the father of interest analysis, thought that the choice of
governing law should not turn on the perhaps fortuitous location of the last
act necessary to create a cause of action.5 1 Rather, choice of law should be-
gin with the recognition that the laws of the competing states reflect the poli-
cies of those states. And the law that is chosen should effectuate those poli-
cies.52 Of course, a state must have a legitimate claim to the application of
its law; New Mexico might take great pride in its tort policies, but if an acci-
dent has no connection with New Mexico, then its policies are irrelevant to a
suit arising from that accident. Territoriality demands this much.
Once a connection with more than one state is established, Currie's next
step is to determine whether each state involved has an "interest" in the ap-
plication of its law to the dispute. No real conflict-of-laws problem arises
unless two or more states whose laws differ have policy interests in the dis-
pute,53 and Currie defined state interests quite narrowly. Specifically, be-
cause legislators pass laws to aid their constituents, Currie thought judges
should assume that a state's laws are intended to protect only state residents,
not outsiders.54 For example, if a Massachusetts plaintiff sued a Virginia
49. State counts for the approaches vary by the commentator. According to Patrick Borchers,
for torts, fifteen states have retained the First Restatement, twenty-four states have adopted the
Second Restatement, four states, including California, use interest analysis, and five states use Le-
fiar's approach, leaving three states unclassified. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 373-74 (1992). See generally
Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233
(1998) (describing states' methodological camps for tort and contracts).
50. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
51. See CuRRIE, supra note 47, at 180-83.
52. See id. at 183-86.
53. See id. at 183-84.
54. See id. at 185-87. See generally John Hart Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in
Protecting its Own, 23 Wi. & MARY L. REV. 173 (1981) (debating the notion that states have a
greater interest in advancing the interests of their own citizens than those of outsiders).
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resident for breach of contract, Virginia would not have an interest in apply-
ing its laws to enforce the contract. To be sure, Virginia contract law reflects
a policy that people should be able to rely on their contracts. However, its
laws are intended to protect the reliance interests of Virginians only. And,
surely, Virginia has no interest in enforcing a contract against one of its own
citizens to the benefit of an outsider, especially if the plaintiff's home state of
Massachusetts would not enforce a similar contract.
Currie concluded that if only one state is interested in a dispute, in this
rather narrow sense, then that state's law should apply. If no state has an
interest, then forum law should be applied to fill the void.55 In this "unpro-
vided[-for] case,"5 6 the controversy must be resolved with reference to some
law, and presumably the familiar forum law is both more easily and more
readily applied.57 But, if more than one state is genuinely interested in the
dispute, then the court should not attempt to weigh or balance the competing
policies. Doing so would require the court to make a "super-value judg-
ment" for which it is ill-equipped. Courts typically lack both the information
necessary to decide which policy is preferable and the techniques to gather
the necessary information. Furthermore, in making such a judgment, they
would be performing essentially a political function more appropriately left
to the legislative branch.58 Instead, a court should resolve the conflict by
giving effect to those policies that judges are placed on the bench to pro-
tect-local ones. Thus, forum law should apply when no state has a genuine
interest in the outcome of a dispute and when two or more states have such
interests; otherwise, the law of the only state with an interest applies.
Baxter agreed with Currie that choice of law should be used to effectuate
states' policies, and he favored generally Currie's interest analysis ap-
proach.5 9 Baxter took issue explicitly only with Currie's treatment of "true
conflicts," those cases where more than one state has an interest in the out-
come.60 Baxter's discussion of states' interests, however, indicated that he
also differed from the master in taking a broader view of what those interests
are, a point to which we shall revert.
To Baxter, the choice of forum law in the case of true conflicts was
every bit as arbitrary as the First Restatement rules. 61 If both South Carolina
and Virginia had an interest in a dispute, a Virginia court would apply Vir-
ginia law, but a South Carolina court would apply South Carolina law. And
thereby the parties were deprived altogether of what he termed "primary pre-
55. See CURRE, supra note 47, at 184.
56. CURRIE, Survival ofActions, supra note 39, at 152.
57. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
58. See CURRIE, supra note 47, at 181-83.
59. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 8.
60. See id. at 8-9.
61. See id. at 9.
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dictability," the ability "to predict what the legal consequences of... [par-
ticular] conduct, if litigated, would be held to be."62 Currie's proposal would
foster what Baxter called "secondary predictability," the ability of the parties
to predict the legal consequences a particular court would attach to past con-
duct once a matter was in litigation.6 But that very predictability would en-
courage forum shopping and races to judgment, and both are wasteful activi-
ties. Currie's proposal therefore "compares unfavorably with any rule of
decision, however arbitrary, that facilitates primary predictability."'64
Baxter offered a normative criterion to resolve true conflicts: Courts
should maximize the joint effectuation of state policies.65 In effect, Baxter
treated true conflicts as optimization problems, which he then resolved by
placing the states in a hypothetical negotiation. Suppose, for example, that
representatives from the states of Virginia and South Carolina sat down to
allocate their respective policymaking spheres of authority. Currie was
clearly correct that each state would gladly cede to the other those cases in
which it lacked any interest. But Baxter went further by pointing out that the
states would also bargain over those cases whose outcome both wanted
power to control. Both states could be made better off if these cases could be
allocated optimally, and, presumably, each would agree to cede control over
those categories of cases in which it had less interest in return for gaining
control over cases in which it had a greater interest. 66 Of course, there would
in fact be no such bargaining among state lawmakers so that it was left to
state law expounders, the judges, to effectuate the hypothetical bargain by
determining, as choice-of-law cases arose, the extent to which each state's
policy would suffer if the court applied the differing law of the other state.
Comparing the resulting impairment of states' policies, then, a court should
apply the law of the state whose policy would suffer the greatest impairment
if its law was not applied. Hence the label "comparative impairment. ' 67
In game theory terms, Currie had assumed that true conflicts cases were
zero-sum games,6 and therefore the resolution of a true conflict constituted a
noncooperative game.69 In effect, Baxter argued that these cases instead had
62. Id. at 3.
63. See id.
64. Id. at 9.
65. See id. at 8-22.
66. See id. at 11-17.
67. See id. at 18.
68. Zero-sum games are those in which any gains to one player, here a state, come at the
identical expense of the other. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C.
PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 43, 317 (1994).
69. Noncooperative games are those in which the players cannot coordinate their decisions.
See MARTIN SHUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CONCEPTS AND SOLUTIONS 217
(1982). In zero-sum games, there are no gains from coordination, and thus players have no.incen-
tive to cooperate.
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a positive sum,70 so that resolving them entailed a potentially cooperative
equilibrium.71
III. THE DIFFIcULTIES OF INTEREST ANALYSIS
Over time, interest analysis acquired its own critics. The most signifi-
cant criticism, for our purposes, is that it abandons "multilateral" choice-of-
law decisionmaking. The First Restatement is methodologically a "multilat-
eral" scheme because its rules are neutrally applied by a state, and no special
advantage is supposed to be given to the law of the forum. Under interest
analysis, by contrast, choice-of-law decisions are made unilaterally.72 The
court first inquires whether its state has an interest in applying its law. If it
does, that is the end of the matter: The law of the state, forum law, is ap-
plied. The debate is ended, and forum law is also applied if no arguably in-
terested state has a real interest in applying its law. Only if the forum state
lacks an interest in applying its law while a sister state has such an interest is
sister-state law applied.
It was predictable that under such a regime forum law would be applied
more frequently than under some others, as recent empirical work confirms.
Although the empiricists disagree about the relative effect of other modem
choice-of-law approaches, all the studies indicate that interest-analysis courts
are more likely to apply forum law in multistate disputes than are courts that
follow the First Restatement rules.73 The increased likelihood that forum law
will be applied highlights a classic difficulty with turning positive realist rea-
soning into normative prescriptions. The critics of the First Restatement
70. Cf Kramer, supra note 8, at 340 (noting that some resolution of choice-of-law issues can
leave both states better off). Baxter did not explicitly use game-theory analysis or even refer to its
vocabulary. He had been introduced to game theory, however, if only by an article that he had
surely read since it appeared in the volume of this Review of which he was a senior editor. Martin
Shubik, A Game Theorist Looks at the Antitrust Laws and the Automobile Industry, 8 STAN. L.
REV. 594 (1956).
71. See BRILMAYER, supra note 2, at 155. As Brilmayer further explained,
What makes the game theory literature so helpful is that it illustrates the possibility of devel-
oping rational strategies that achieve better results through cooperation than through short-run
pursuit of selfish gains. Even in a situation where there is no authoritative enforcer of choice
of law rules, states may in some circumstances be able to do significantly better in achieving
their own goals if they act with awareness of the goals they share with others. In older choice
of law cases, this point was intuitively described in terms of comity and reciprocity.
Id. at 157-58 (citations omitted).
72. For a general discussion of the distinction between unilateral and multilateral choice-of-
law decisionmaking, see William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An
Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 101, 106-21 (1998).
73. See Borchers, supra note 49, at 366; Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical
Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. L. REV. 49, 50 (1989) (noting that critics have found modem
approaches to be "pro-resident, pro-forum law, pro-recovery"); Stuart Thiel, Choice of Law and the
Home Court Advantage: Evidence, at text accompanying nn.57-60 (1996) (unpublished manuscript
on file with the Stanford Law Review).
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pointed to a number of decisions in which courts manipulated the First Re-
statement rules or used an escape device such as the public policy exception
in order to apply forum law. The critics therefore concluded that the rules
did not impose any real constraint on judges.74 If, the critics went on, courts
were not effectively constrained by the supposedly multilateral choice-of-law
approach, then courts should at least be open about their unilateral decision-
making.75 Interest analysis theoretically enables judges to be more honest
and, at the same time, to effectuate state interests. However, once courts
moved away from the First Restatement rules, they applied forum law even
more often.
The preceding paragraph implies a belief that a bias in favor of forum
law is undesirable. Economic arguments in favor of such a bias, based on
the benefit of creating useful home-state law precedent (as against relatively
useless interpretations of foreign law) and the greater cost of ascertaining
foreign law, can clearly be made. We believe, however, that, to the extent
that any such advantages of forum-law bias exist, they are offset by the en-
couragement that it gives to forum shopping and races to judgment. Quite
simply, if courts are likely to apply forum law, then the benefits of forum
shopping rise.76
The possibilities of finding a favorable forum are probably even greater
than they were thirty-five years ago, when Baxter noted that "members of
our society, in both their personal and business activities, increasingly disre-
gard the existence of state boundaries," 77 and that people and companies can
be sued in more and more places.78 In those circumstances, the application
of the law of whatever state happens to be the forum seriously impairs pri-
mary predictability.79 We again quote his explanation of the term: "[T]he
74. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 47, at 181 (noting that choice-of-law rules are "loaded with
escape devices"); David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV.
173, 198 (1933) (pointing out the difficulty of formulating effective rules).
75. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 47, at 181 ("[W]e are handicapped in even presenting the is-
sue in its true light .... ").
76. We have quoted Baxter's criticism on this score above and cannot improve upon it. See
text accompanying notes 15 & 64 supra.
77. Baxter, supra note 4, at 1.
78. See id.
79. One might quarrel with the textual argument by urging that, since we can expect future
plaintiffs to sue in that forum that has the most plaintiff-favorable local laws, Currie's interest
analysis provides plenty of primary predictability. We find this argument lacking for at least two
reasons. First, plaintiffs choose their fora for many reasons in addition to seeking favorable laws.
Some attorneys prefer the ease of litigating in local courts, and others prefer favorable jury pools.
Moreover, the parties may create unexpected contacts with new states ex post, opening up forum
possibilities that were not contemplated at the time of the parties' transaction or litigation-creating
acts. Second, people often cannot predict which party will be the named plaintiff in a future dis-
pute. In contracts, for example, the "victim" of a breach can sue for breach of contract, but the
breacher might sue first, bringing a declaratory judgment action. Compare Shipley Co. v. Kozlow-
ski, 926 F. Supp. 28 (D. Mass. 1996) (employer sued former employee for breach of noncompeti-
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ability of persons (or their attorneys), at the time they are conducting their
business or driving their automobiles or drawing their wills or engaging in
analogous activities other than litigation, to predict what the consequences of
that conduct, if litigated, would be held to be."80
Public choice theory has revealed an additional problem, not generally
discussed in the conflicts literature,81 with the definition of interests: Interest
analysis can increase both the likelihood and the durability of inefficient
laws-laws that do not allocate benefits and burdens in the way that maxi-
mizes the welfare of citizens of a state. States, as we have said, were pre-
sumed by Currie to be interested only in protecting or compensating their
own. Legislators serve their constituents, not outsiders. Thus, it seemed
only natural, although admittedly cynical, to assume that any state's law was
intended to aid insiders only.
Public choice theory tells us that some interest groups organize more
cheaply and effectively than others to extract legislative favors, and that, as a
consequence, statutes do not necessarily allocate burdens and benefits effi-
ciently.82 However, as Gary Becker has pointed out, there is a natural limit
on the degree to which winning groups can impose costs on the rest of soci-
ety in order to reap those legislative gains. Eventually a regulatory or other
legislative program created as a result of political pressure can become so
costly that taxpayers are willing to incur the relatively large costs of organ-
izing to alleviate the costly tax and/or regulatory burdens imposed by the
more readily organized group's activities.83 Awareness of the possibility of
organized protest can be enough to minimize the costs of both seeking and
implementing inefficient laws.84
tion agreement), with Enron Capital & Trade Resources Corp. v. Pokalsky, 490 S.E.2d 136 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1997) (employee and new employer sue former employer to void noncompetition agreement).
80. Baxter, supra note 4, at 3.
8 1. For another very brief discussion of this public choice insight, see Erin O'Hara & Larry E.
Ribstein, Interest Groups, Contracts and Interest Analysis, 48 MERCER L. REV. 765, 766-68 (1997)
(noting that the real intent of legislatures cannot necessarily be deduced by hypothesizing a public
purpose).
82. See generally ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS,
LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF
GOVERNMENT (1981) (examining the brokering function provided by politicians in supplying leg-
islation to groups); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND
THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1971) (arguing that members of a large group tend not to act to advance
common interests); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION
(1975) (noting that some groups stand to gain more than others from boons the State can confer).
83. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371, 390-91 (1983) (describing the process of achieving general political equi-
librium).
84. For a discussion of this possible effect, as well as the influence of the courts, in the crimi-
nal law context, see Richard S. Murphy & Erin A. O'Hara, Mistake of Federal Criminal Law: A
Study of Coalitions and Costly Information, 5 SUP. Cr. ECON. REV. 217, 238-43, 274-78 (1997).
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Interest analysis may skew the interest group balance toward ineffi-
ciency, however. Under interest analysis, a state's laws are more likely to be
applied against outsiders than against the insiders who can more effectively
oppose the legislation. And the outsiders against whom a law is applied lack
a direct voice in the legislature, so that costs imposed on them may not be
fully internalized within the state. One of us has elaborated on this point
elsewhere, using the following example:
[S]uppose state C has few manufacturers and wants to impose more products li-
ability than is optimal (i.e., more than consumers would be willing to buy). The
legislature may pass the law in the absence of voting pressure from those
aligned with manufacturers. Interest analysis helps promote this result by en-
suring application of the law by state C courts to local consumers, but not nec-
essarily against local manufacturers, most of whose customers may live outside
the state. Even if the court is willing to apply local law to an out of state plain-
tiff, the latter may be deterred from taking advantage of the bias by the need to
travel and hire local counsel. Thus, interest analysis facilitates inefficient laws
by imposing the costs of those laws on people and firms who have no direct
vote.
85
The empirical studies comparing state choice-of-law approaches for torts
all confnm the factual premise of our argument: The modem approaches,
especially interest analysis, tend to lead to choice-of-law determinations fa-
voting the local resident (and disfavoring the foreign party) more often than
under the First Restatement. 6 New York's famous guest statute cases also
provide evidence, albeit anecdotal, of the interest analysis bias in favor of
local residents against foreign residents. In a series of cases, New York's
highest court considered the applicability of a foreign guest statute, which
either precludes or limits a passenger's ability to recover from a host driver
for injuries sustained in a car accident caused by the driver's negligence,
when New York had no such guest statute.
85. O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 81, at 767. For a similar argument, see Michael W.
McConnell, A Choice-of-Law Approach to Products-Liability Reform, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
LIABILITY LAW 90 (Walter Olson ed., 1988) (noting that no state can ensure that its consumers,
manufacturers, and workers will capture the benefits of its legislation). But see Bruce L. Hay, Con-
flicts of Law and State Competition in the Product Liability System, 80 GEO. L.J. 617, 632-36
(1992) (arguing that interest analysis leads to less expansive products liability than did the First
Restatement).
86. See Borchers, supra note 49, at 377 (citing study of approximately 800 state and federal
cases, which indicates that the decisions of states using modem approaches more frequently favor
residents than those of First Restatement states); Solimine, supra note 73, at 87-89 (study of 227
state and federal tort cases indicates decisions rendered according to modem choice-of-law theories
relatively more resident-favoring than First Restatement decisions); Thiel, supra note 73, at tbl.4
(using more sophisticated methodology to analyze Borchers' data and concluding that interest
analysis states have stronger bias toward residents in their determinations than states using any
other choice-of-law approach). See generally Erin A. O'Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Law and Eco-
nomics of Conflicts of Law and Choice of Law, in GHENT INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW
AND ECONoMICs (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review).
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In the first case, Babcock v. Jackson,87 both passenger and driver were
New York residents, and the accident occurred in Ontario, which at the time
precluded recovery by guest passengers against their host drivers. The court
ignored the guest statute and applied New York's simple negligence rule,
noting that New York had a strong interest in ensuring compensation to its
injured residents. 8 In contrast, Ontario's statute was intended to prevent the
fraudulent assertion of claims by passengers in collusion with their drivers
against insurance companies.8 9 Because the statute was intended to prevent
fraudulent claims only against Ontario defendants and their insurance com-
panies, Ontario had no significant interest in the outcome of the case.90
The second case, Tooker v. Lopez,91 also involved New York residents.
The passenger was killed in Michigan, where both passenger and driver were
college students. The trip in question took place solely within the state of
Michigan, which had a guest statute. Because both students resided in New
York, however, the court reasoned that New York had the same interest in
compensating the plaintiff that it did in Babcock.92 Michigan had no corre-
sponding interest in preventing fraudulent claims, because the car was regis-
tered and insured in New York.93
The court took an interesting turn, however, in Neumeier v. Kuehner.94
In this third case, the driver, a New York resident, registered and insured his
car in New York. His guest, an Ontario resident, was injured in Ontario.
The New York court reasoned that here, unlike Tooker, New York had no
interest in applying its law, because it did not care about guaranteeing com-
pensation to Ontario residents.95 According to the court's reasoning in Bab-
cock and Tooker, Ontario had no interest in preventing fraudulent claims,
because the driver, a New York resident, had insured his car in New York.96
Based on the previous cases, then, Neumeier seemed to be an unprovided-for
case in which New York law would therefore apply.
Not so, however. In Neumeier itself, New York's lack of interest in the
case indicated to the court that New York was not justified in ignoring On-
tario's laws. Moreover, the passenger was entitled to no more protection
than his home state laws afforded him, given that his trip was confined
within Ontario's borders. In the end, then, New York's law was applied to
87. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1963).
88. See id. at 284.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1969).
92. See id. at 399.
93. See id. at 398.
94. 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1972).
95. See id. at 456.
96. See id. at 457-58.
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help New York residents, but not to hurt them at the expense of outsiders.
And the extent to which New Yorkers would bear the brunt of the law,
through either direct liability or insurance premiums, would therefore be re-
duced.
Whatever else one might think of a court's bias in favor of its residents,
that bias can affect that state's statutes. Because of resident bias, a state's
residents fully capture the benefits of its laws, here compensation to New
York plaintiffs, but may not be subject to the costs the law imposes, here de-
fendant liabilities. While this does not necessarily render the resulting laws
inefficient, the spillover effects of court bias on the efficiency of enacted
statutes can be detrimental.
IV. COMPARATIVE IMPAIRMENT: AN IMPROVEMENT ON INTEREST
ANALYSIS?
Baxter's signal contribution was devising a rational method of resolving
those cases whose difficulty made Brainerd Currie figuratively throw up his
hands: the cases of true conflicts between state laws. Baxter, as we have
said, embraced Currie's idea of the false conflict; he began his hypothetical
state bargaining session by having each of his states X and Y agree to con-
cede to the other control of cases in which it had no genuine interest. Only
after those easy concessions did he have them begin their more serious trad-
ing of this impairment of X's policy objective for that impairment of Y's. 97
Baxter ignored Currie's unprovided-for cases, those cases in which no state
had a real interest, which Currie also assigned to forum law. That was per-
haps because, while he did not expressly disagree with Currie's narrow defi-
nition of state interests, his hypothetical cases reveal a broader, more nu-
anced view of what policy interests a state has when it enacts a statute or
otherwise adopts a rule of law. He may have thought that, on such a view,
there would be only a trivial number of unprovided-for cases.
In any event, the true-conflict cases were the subject of his comparative-
impairment analysis. He believed that comparative impairment, adopted
across the board, would yield as much primary predictability for the parties
as is possible in a multistate nation and at the same time advance the policy
objectives of each of the several states to the maximum extent feasible. To
explain and give substance to his analysis, Baxter offered examples of how
comparative impairment would work.
He posited a case in which state X imposes liability on all persons and
enterprises only for harm caused by negligence. State Y, on the other hand,
has singled out food processors and imposes on them liability without fault
for harm caused by the distribution of an adulterated product. The easy,
97. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 7-8.
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false-conflict cases are those involving Y (or non-A) food processors, in
which X has no interest, and those involving X (or non-Y) consumers, in
which Y has no interest. But, Baxter said, it does not necessarily follow that
the states' interests are in balance in a case involving an X food processor
and a Y consumer.98 Perhaps the consumer, residing in Y, is domiciled in X;
or the consumer has died and the suit is for the benefit of relatives identified
with X. In either case, Y's interest in protecting its consumers is diminished
and can properly be subordinated to X's. On the other hand, if the X food
processor, "though incorporated in X, has its principal place of business in Y,
or if the processor, for any reason, is less identifiable with Xthan is the con-
sumer with Y," X's interest is diminished and i's rule of absolute liability
properly controls.99
Baxter's next example consists of variations on this pattern. X has a
highway speed limit and its law provides that violation of the limit is per se
negligent. Y also has a speed limit but no per se negligence rule. In the first
version, a resident of Y driving a truck on an Xhighway violates the X speed
limit and causes injury to a resident of X Xs per se negligence rule should
be applied because X has an interest in implementing its regulatory speed-
limit rule within its boundaries, and its interest in the application of its per-se
rule offsets i's interest in application of its own rule governing the distribu-
tion of losses. Similarly, if an Xdriver injures a Y resident, the Xper se rule
should be applied because Xhas an interest in regulating speeds on its high-
ways; again the differing loss-distribution rules offset one another. But, fi-
nally, if a Y driver injures a Y resident, the answer is different. To the exclu-
sion of X, Yhas an interest in how losses are distributed among its residents.
X, to be sure, has a regulatory interest in the enforcement of its speed limit
(which its lawmakers think is aided by the per se loss-distribution rule), but
that regulatory interest "will not be impaired significantly if it is subordi-
nated in the comparatively rare instances involving two nonresidents, who
are residents of a state or states that reject the per se subrule." 100
Those examples were tort cases. For a consensual example, Baxter sup-
posed a usury statute in state Xbut not in state Y. Both states recognized "the
commercial importance of performance of consensual undertakings and ac-
cess to the largest possible number of customers."'0 But X, unlike Y, had
decided that an exception to the usual freedom to contract should be made in
order to protect a described class of borrowers against overreaching or bad
judgment. First, Baxter said that the X usury law should not be applied to
any case not involving an X borrower, because no purpose of X would be
98. See id. at 7-8.
99. Id. at I.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id. at 14.
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served by application of X law,102 and thus this case would present a false
conflict. But Baxter reasoned that not all cases involving an X borrower
should be subject to X law since, if the borrowing was done in Y from a Y
lender, Y's interest in freedom of commercial transactions deserved consid-
eration. A choice-of-law rule based on the identity of the lender, on the other
hand, would go too far in 's direction because it would encourage the pro-
liferation of lending institutions just across the border from X in Y, attracting
would-be Xborrowers and thereby impairing X's interest in protecting them.
The answer that, according to Baxter, "affords maximum implementation of
the policies of both states," 103 is to apply the Xusury law when the Y lender
knows of a borrower's residence in X and not otherwise. 0 4
Baxter's final hypotheticals provide an alternative to the much-maligned
rule that the law of the situs determines issues affecting real property. In the
first hypothetical, he described what he regarded as a case of a false conflict:
A man who has lived for many years with his wife and children in X dies
intestate, leaving land in Y. Under the X law of intestacy, one-third of the
property goes to the widow, two-thirds to the children in equal shares; under
Y law, the property is divided equally between the widow and the children.
Because no Y party is involved, Y law is simply not pertinent and the X law
of succession governs. After all, X's law reflected its policy regarding how
property should be distributed among its resident family members upon the
death of one of them. Then came the hard case: that of the deceased resident
of X who had devised the real property in Y to members of his family, all
residents of X, in a will that violated Y's Rule Against Perpetuities but not
X's. In this case, Y as the situs expressed in its Rule Against Perpetuities its
real interest in freeing property from long-term restraints in favor of al-
ienability and thus economic development to the benefit of its residents. X's
less restrictive Rule Against Perpetuities expresses its interest in the freedom
of its testators to dispose of property as they wish. Baxter's solution: Apply
the law of the situs except in the rare instance in which the testator did not
know he was devising Y real estate. The resulting impairment of Y's interest
is minimal because of the rarity of such cases, and X's interest in testamen-
tary freedom is thus furthered at small cost.105
There are a few things to be said about Baxter's hypotheticals. First, as
we have suggested, they demonstrate his appreciation that state interests, in
their richness and variety, go beyond Currie's protection of resident defen-
dants and compensation of resident plaintiffs. Baxter recognized state inter-
ests in maintaining free markets, protecting reasonable party expectations,
and fostering the transferability of property. Furthermore, Baxter does not
102. See id.
103. Id. at 15.
104. See id. at 14-15.
105. Seeid. at 16-17.
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flinch. He does not pose easy cases. Indeed, the case of the Y driver injuring
the Y resident on an X highway is so closely balanced that, it seems to us,
Baxter had to strain to find factors that might justify a decision for one
state's law rather than the other's. And he acknowledged the difficulty:
"Borderline cases arise that thwart easy application of every principle of law,
but they are decided nonetheless. The judge decides on the basis of some
marginal factor and justifies his decision as best he can in his opinion."106 In
a footnote to one of his hypothetical cases that seems to us telling, he said
that the process of identifying "the objective or objectives underlying" each
contesting state's rules "will sometimes be difficult, and reasonable dis-
agreement may exist regarding" such objectives. 107 He continued:
In the present and subsequent hypothetical cases used to illustrate application of
the suggested analysis, I state the objectives I think commonly underlie various
internal rules. A reader who disagrees with the objective assigned to any par-
ticular internal rule will probably disagree with the choice-of-law conclusion I
suggest. But disagreement on that basis does not necessarily involve, and
should be distinguished from, disagreement with the choice analysis sug-
gested.108
In that same footnote, Baxter stated that the process of identifying objec-
tives underlying state rules, while sometimes difficult, "is a familiar one
rather than a unique concomitant of the choice analysis proposed."'0 9 We are
not sure quite what this means; judges must often interpret statutes and, in
doing so, will seek to understand what purposes the lawmaker intended to
achieve by them. That seems different from seeking the objective that un-
derlies a known rule. However, our concern with Baxter's comparative-
impairment analysis is that, while acknowledging the difficulties, including
the possibility of "reasonable disagreement" regarding a state's policy objec-
tives, he underestimated them. Baxter himself wrote that the comparative-
impairment principle seemed to him "vulnerable to attack only on the ground
of uncertainty-that it is so vacuous in content and uncertain in application
as to be inappropriate for adjudicative administration."' 10 We would not
choose the pejorative "vacuous" as our descriptor, but our criticism of com-
parative impairment is substantially the one that Baxter himself anticipated
in his scholarly candor. For reasons that we elaborate immediately below,
we doubt that it can be applied predictably in the "substantial majority of
cases," as Baxter claimed.1
We fear that, in practice, judges have neither the data nor the intuitive
understanding of the complexities of any legal problem to make the com-
106. Id. at9.
107. Id. at 12 n.28.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at20.
111. Id. at21.
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parative-impairment determination in the scrupulous, analytical way that
Baxter envisioned. In the end, judges must make rough guesses, as in a vast
array of judicial contexts. If, however, what is sought is a judgment as to
which of two states' policies will be least impaired by application of another
state's law to a multi-state dispute, virtually every such case will lack an
easy, empirically demonstrable solution. The difficulty lies in the nature of
the interstate dispute in which there is a true conflict. By definition, at least
two states, each with a legitimate claim to apply its own laws, have reached
different conclusions regarding the appropriate treatment of a legal problem.
Either this particular interstate situation will arise rarely, in which case nei-
ther state's policy is much affected by the choice-of-law rule, or it will be a
common occurrence, in which case both states' policies would be signifi-
cantly impaired by the choice of the other state's law. 12 The comparison
would be simple if one state's policy were barely impaired while the other
state's policy would suffer significant impairment. But, almost always,
courts must compare either two large impairments or two very small ones.
In either case, making a determination about relative impairments will almost
always be difficult.
Consider, for example, the California case Bernhard v. Harrah 's Club,' 3
a case in which a court professedly applied Baxter's mode of analysis.1 4 A
California patron of Harrah's Club, a Nevada casino, was returning to Cali-
fornia on a California highway. The patron was intoxicated and injured Cali-
fornia plaintiffs in an automobile accident. In California, a tavern keeper is
forbidden to serve alcohol to an intoxicated patron; furthermore, the tavern
keeper is liable to third parties for any injuries caused by the patron if the
tavern keeper continued to serve alcohol to him after he became intoxicated.
Nevada did not hold the tavern keeper liable to third parties for these inju-
ries, although a misdemeanor criminal statute did forbid serving alcohol to a
drunk patron.
112. There are some possible exceptions to this point. Occasionally, the applicable law of one
state will already have been changed or repealed, but retroactivity rules permit the application of the
old law to a particular dispute. For example, suppose that state A had a guest statute in force at the
time of the accident, but repealed it in favor of a simple negligence rule by the time of litigation. In
this case, both state A and state B, which always had a negligence rule, have expressed policies in
favor of compensation. Currie would have labeled this case a false conflict after performing a
"moderate and restrained interpretation both of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must
be applied to effectuate the forum's legitimate purpose." Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 757 (1963). In contrast, Baxter might identify a true con-
flict but nevertheless conclude that state B's policies will suffer more impairment. Here is an ex-
ample where state A has a policy but doesn't value it much. In Baxter's hypothetical bargaining
scenario, state A might well trade away its lawmaking authority here in exchange for gaining it
someplace else. Typically, however, the two states favor competing policies reflected in their pres-
ently enforced laws, in which case our textual point holds.
113. 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976).
114. See id. at 723-24.
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Bernhard clearly presents a true conflict. California presumably seeks to
deter automobile accidents by depriving tavern keepers of their financial in-
centive to promote drunkenness. California also seeks to ensure compensa-
tion to those injured by drunk drivers. Nevada, on the other hand, seeks to
protect its tavern keepers from excessive liability. Drinking and gambling
cater to the tourist trade, and tourism comprises an important service industry
in Nevada. Nevada has chosen to discourage the serving of drunk patrons
with a criminal statute rather than with civil liability. Presumably the crimi-
nal statute protects the tavern keepers with prosecutorial discretion, a higher
burden of proof, and other procedural safeguards. And the criminal fines
may well be smaller than the potential civil liabilities. Clearly, then, each
state is interested in applying its own laws.
Suppose this is a rare case. That is, suppose, contrary to what is proba-
bly the fact, that California residents rarely drive into Nevada to drink and
gamble, so that Californians rarely are injured as a consequence of Nevada
tavern keepers' behavior. If so, neither state suffers much as a consequence
of the application of the other state's laws. Even if this particular tavern
keeper is held liable, other Nevada tavern keepers have little cause for con-
cern precisely because the case is a rare one. Their practices, prices, and in-
surance coverage will likely go unaltered. Similarly, California will not ex-
perience an increase in accident rates or uncompensated plaintiffs if Nevada
law is applied. It can still effectuate its policies, even if this particular acci-
dent was not prevented. And this particular injured plaintiff may well be
able to sue the drunk driver or his own insurance company to get compensa-
tion for his injuries.
Now, suppose instead that what happened in Bernhard happens fre-
quently. Suppose, more realistically, that every weekend California patrons
pour into Nevada where they drink and then try to drive back home, risking
the lives of others on the California highways. Now California's policies in
favor of deterrence and compensation suffer significant impairment if Cali-
fornia law is not applied to these accidents. On the other hand, Nevada also
has a lot at stake in this case. If potential liability turns on the domicile or
destination of the patrons, something that a bartender cannot easily discern,
then the entire practice of the tavern keepers must change. Insurance rates
will likely rise, assuming that insurance is even available to cover this liabil-
ity. Moreover, the taverns' prices will rise for all patrons, and some taverns
may be driven out of business by the threat of liability.
Regardless of the frequency of these cases, the determination of whose
law would be most impaired is impossible to make with certainty. When the
cases occur rarely, the choice-of-law determination is perhaps of little conse-
quence. When they occur frequently, the choice-of-law determination mat-
ters more. But given the plausibility of either result under comparative im-
pairment, there is no reason to believe that in either instance one state's
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courts will choose the same governing law as the other. This uncertainty
erodes the purported benefits of comparative impairment.
In the actual Bernhard case, the Supreme Court of California based its
decision on the fact that the Nevada tavern keeper solicited business in Cali-
fornia. Because the club was purposely seeking to reap profits from Califor-
nia patrons, it seemed fair to subject the club to California's liability rules.' 15
The court restricted its fairness analysis to the parties-it considered the par-
ticular defendant Nevada tavern keeper rather than Nevada tavern keepers
generally. However laudable the concern may be, such an argument has lit-
tle to do with comparative impairment.
Baxter himself applied criteria exogenous to his proposal to justify some
of his suggested outcomes. When discussing true conflicts involving usury
laws, for example, Baxter proposed that the lender's less stringent state law
be applied unless the lender knows or had reason to know the residence of
the borrower, in which case the laws of the borrower's state should be ap-
plied.116 In support of this result, Baxter pointed out that the policy behind
the state law of the borrower, protecting some borrowers, "would be shielded
from wholesale evasion ... [by assuring] that prior to extending credit the
lender will discover.., characteristics of membership in the protected
class."'1 7  At the same time, the lenders' "[c]onsensual expectations""'
would be protected. The result, in truth, turns on the normative criterion of
fairness to the parties rather than on the maximization of state policies.
Baxter also shifted focus in his Rule Against Perpetuities hypothetical. 19
He concluded that the situs state's law should govern this testamentary issue
unless the decedent was unaware that he was devising property located in the
situs state. Once again, fairness to a party, here the testator, supplants any
real assessment of which state's policy will be least impaired by applying the
other's law.
Complicating both the determination of state interests and the calculation
of relative state impairment is the state legislative practice of bundling is-
sues. Two seemingly unrelated (or related but different) laws may work to-
gether to produce a result intended by the legislature. However, if either law
is considered in isolation, both its purpose and importance can easily be mis-
construed. Returning to the Bernhard case, for example, the California court
apparently assumed that Nevada's criminalization of the sale of alcohol to
drunk patrons represented a policy of deterring certain behavior. While the
court was no doubt correct, it missed Nevada's delicate balancing of the in-
115. See id. at 725 (finding that defendant, by advertising and otherwise soliciting California
business, "has put itself at the heart of California's regulatory interest").
116. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 14-15.
117. Id. at 15.
118. Id.
119. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 16.
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centives when it ignored the procedural protections and relatively modest
sanctions 120 that had been bundled with Nevada's substantive criminal prohi-
bition.
A related problem, the issue of depecage, already has been identified by
conflicts scholars. Depecage refers to the separation of legal issues within a
single case, where state A law is applied to some issues, but state B law is
applied to others.121 Often, under interest analysis, a court ends up splitting
the substantive law applicable in a single case. Depecage can occur when-
ever a court determines that state A is interested in some legal issues while
state B is interested in others, and therefore applies the substantive laws of
state A to resolve some issues while applying state B's law to resolve others
in the very same case. When each state's policy bundle is split in this fash-
ion, the outcome of the case might be one that ultimately furthers neither
state's policy.
Of course, depecage may have either a positive or negative effect, de-
pending on the legal issues involved. When two state laws or rules are so
closely related or interconnected that they appear to come as a package, then
splitting up the laws and applying only one to a case thwarts state policies.
To give an example, suppose that a resident of state X sues a resident of state
Y to recover for a death caused in state Y. Suppose further that state X per-
mits a cause of action for wrongful death but caps damages for wrongful
death at $25,000. Suppose that state Y does not permit a cause of action for
wrongful death, and a state law prohibits caps on tort judgments. Suit is filed
in state X, an interest-analysis state, and the court first considers whether the
plaintiff can sue for wrongful death. State Xlaw will likely apply to this is-
sue because state Xhas an interest in ensuring compensation for its residents.
Then suppose that the court considers separately the issue of damages. Here,
the court might apply the state Y law capping damages, because X has no
interest in caps that protect non-X defendants, yet Y has an interest in deter-
ring accidents, which may be furthered by prohibiting damage caps. Thus,
the plaintiff may be able to bring a wrongful death claim with potentially
unlimited damages, a result that could not occur independently under either
state's law. Depecage in this case frustrates the decision of the legislature of
state X to condition recovery for wrongful death on capping the awardable
damages, reasoning that a large award would generate a windfall for the sur-
vivors. And state Ymay have disallowed the wrongful death action precisely
because it was unable to cap the damages. In both states, then, the cause of
120. See Bernhard, 546 P.2d at 721-22.
121. See SYMEON C. SYMEONIDES, WENDY COLLINS PERDUE & ARTHUR T. VON MEHREN,
CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 128 (1998). Depecage is com-
mon in interstate cases if only because the forum virtually always applies its own procedural law,
but it may apply another state's substantive law.
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action and the limitation come as a package: Either both appear in the state's
laws, or neither is available.
Courts often fail to take this packaging or bundling of laws into consid-
eration. When a rule is wrongly interpreted, or evaluated without reference
to the rest of its bundle, the interpreter or evaluator has committed what is
known in law and economics as the "isolation fallacy. 1 22 When a rule is
considered in isolation without regard to the general policy of which that rule
may be only a part, the outcome may be bad policy. Courts using Baxter's
comparative-impairment analysis are particularly susceptible to this fallacy.
One of Baxter's hypotheticals suggests why. Recall his example of state
X, which has a speed limit and a rule that violation of the speed limit was per
se negligence, and state Y, which also had a speed limit but no per-se negli-
gence rule.123 He used the example, among other things, to distinguish be-
tween conduct-regulating and loss-distribution rules within tort law. Con-
duct-regulating rules are designed to encourage a particular level of care to
prevent accidents, while loss-distribution rules allocate the risk of injury
when an accident occurs. Baxter classified the speed limit as conduct-
regulating and the per se negligence rule as loss-distributing, though ac-
knowledging that the latter might affect conduct somewhat.
In one variation of the hypothetical, a truck driver resident in Y injures
another resident of Y while driving on a highway in X in violation of that
state's speed limit. Baxter concluded that comparative-impairment analysis
called for the application of Y's law because Y has an interest in how losses
are allocated among its residents and Xhas none. Moreover, the knowledge
that X's stringent liability rules would not apply if he injured another Y resi-
dent while speeding would be unlikely to motivate a Y truck driver to speed
and thus thwart X's interest in highway safety. Thus, X's interest, expressed
in its conduct-regulating speed limit, would be impaired only slightly if I"s
law was applied.
Let us now consider the problem from the perspective of state policy
bundles. The issues of driver safety and criminal, administrative, and civil
liabilities are bound together along with such issues as no-fault insurance and
mandatory insurance coverage. Different states may use different combina-
tions of these laws to minimize both the incidence and thus the costs of acci-
dents and the costs of enforcing the relevant legal rules. For example, two
states may set differing speed limits for the same set of driving conditions,
yet enforce those speed limits in differing ways. State P may have a lower
speed limit for its highways, say fifty-five miles per hour, whereas state Q
122. Cf. Maxwell L. Steams, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J.
1219, 1230 n.35 (1994) ("The isolation fallacy is the failure to recognize that a particular institution
that cycles might not cycle if it works in conjunction with another institution.").
123. See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
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permits drivers to travel on its comparable highways at sixty-five miles per
hour. On its face, then, state P appears to have chosen a policy outcome dif-
ferent from the one state Q has chosen. However, the speed limits them-
selves are only a small part of either state's efforts to encourage safe driving.
State P may have a relatively low fine for speeding less than ten miles over
the speed limit, for example, whereas state Q may impose high fines for any
driving in excess of the speed limit. And, given the fine structure, traffic
officers in both states may refrain from ticketing those who are driving less
than sixty-five miles per hour. When the speed limit is now considered in
conjunction with the fines and traffic enforcement, the bundles suggest that
the policies of the two states regarding safe driving speeds are in accord.124
States also may choose different legal tools to encourage safe driving
speeds. Even if states P and Q both chose a sixty-five-mile-per-hour maxi-
mum highway speed, state P might rely primarily on police enforcement
whereas state Q might prefer private enforcement. This difference might
turn on a variety of factors including the costs of providing traffic enforce-
ment. State P might find it cheaper to employ a large traffic patrol force, and
patrol officers might be better able to recoup patrolling expenses with the
traffic ticket revenues. State Q might have more difficulty supporting the
expense of public enforcement and decide that adding a strong threat of civil
liability in the event of an accident was necessary to adequately deter unsafe
driving.12 State Q might quite sensibly adopt a per se negligence rule to aid
its efforts.
Thus, states can use differing bundles of mechanisms to produce a given
ex ante behavioral incentive. State P might have a fifty-five-mile-per-hour
speed limit and no per se negligence rule. State P might prefer public en-
forcement and choose the fifty-five-mile-per-hour limit to allow for some
slack in enforcement. If so, a per se negligence rule would not make sense.
In contrast, suppose that state Q chooses a sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed
limit and wants to send a clear signal that this limit should be strictly heeded.
State Q might sensibly adopt a per se negligence rule, especially if enforce-
ment becomes costly.
124. The real difference here may lie in state concerns for speedometer inaccuracies. State P
may set the speed limit lower than the safe maximum of sixty-five miles per hour to take into ac-
count the possibility that a car's speedometer will underestimate the speed at which the car is trav-
elling. If ticketing occurs only when a car is detected by radar to be travelling at sixty-five miles
per hour or faster, then the police can safely assume that the driver was aware that he was exceeding
the fifty-five miles per hour limit. 'State Q may ignore these concerns, and may prefer to instead
send the community a clear signal that the laws reflect the limits of safety and should be followed
outright. In state Q, then, the driver bears the entire risk of erroneous speedometer readings.
125. State Q might also have more problems controlling police corruption or selective en-
forcement of the speed limits. In these cases, an accident often proves in itself that the driver ex-
ceeded the bounds of safety, so that something external to the police officer's veracity established
the driver's culpability.
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Now, returning to Baxter's hypothetical, suppose that the defendant
drove five miles per hour faster than state X's sixty-five-mile-per-hour speed
limit. Suppose further that Y had adopted a fifty-five-mile-per-hour speed
limit. In this case, state Xs per se negligence rule might be recognized as a
means of preventing people from driving seventy miles per hour. Though its
nominal speed limit is lower than X's, State Y shares the desire to prevent
people from driving seventy miles per hour, but it has chosen instead to have
an active patrol force and to impose substantial fines for driving that fast. In
both states, driving at seventy miles per hour and causing an accident results
in significant monetary punishment.
If that is the explanation of X's per se negligence rule, then comparative
impairment enables the Y truck driver to escape both the high fine that his
state exacts for speeding on its highways and the per se negligence liability
that X imposes. In short, depecage prevents both states' policies from being
effectuated.
We have, no doubt, indulged in a fair amount of speculation about the
bundling of state rules and the goals each state might be attempting to
achieve with this bundling. And we did not consider the effects of automo-
bile insurance on state regulatory efforts. But the difficulties of determining
exactly what a state intended with which set of rules in any given context
helps to demonstrate our basic point: The comparative-impairment approach
requires factual details and analytic foci that typically exceed available judi-
cial resources.
There is a final point: In many cases, judges will not be overly precise in
applying their comparative-impairment analysis. Judicial decisions serve as
precedents for future litigants, so that the information contained in both the
decision and its accompanying opinion becomes a public good (or bad, if the
decision is wrong). The public good aspect of decisionmaking encourages
judges to invest time and effort to generate sound precedents. 126 And, be-
cause the precedent created today likely will be applied in the future to dif-
ferent parties, judges have some incentive to decide the present case impar-
tially.
When the case involves a choice of law, however, these pressures toward
soundness and impartiality may be quite weak. Judges have less incentive to
create sound precedents if their decisions are unlikely to be used in the fiu-
ture.127 The narrower the judicial inquiry and the rarer the factual context,
the less that precedent will be relied on in the future. Because the precedent
126. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 28 (5th ed. 1998) ("The judge
must therefore consider the probable impact of alternative rulings on the future behavior of people
engaged in activities that give rise to the kind of accident involved in the case before him.").
127. Lower court judges might also generate sound precedents to avoid being reversed on ap-
peal. However, if a choice-of-law decision is unlikely to be relied on in future cases, then the ap-
pellate court has little incentive to scrutinize closely the trial court's determination.
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generated by the comparative-impairment analysis is necessarily narrow, the
judge likely is not willing to invest much in his decision. After all, the out-
come of this state interest balancing will apply only when, for example, the
plaintiff is a resident of state X, the defendant is from state Y, the relevant
events occurred in state Z, and the dispute involves this specific legal issue.
And yet, the comparative-impairment inquiry is routinely difficult. This
combination of a weak incentive to be right and a high risk of being wrong
undermines the practical utility of the comparative-impairment approach.
When judges lack the incentive to produce sound decisions, then other
influences predominate. Some judges may decide cases with an eye toward
simplifying the judicial task. Applying the law of the state that denies a
cause of action to the plaintiff may be an extreme example, but, more realis-
tically, lazy or overworked judges may apply forum law more often when the
precedential value of their determinations is low. 128 Other judges may be
more result-oriented and prefer to see that litigation generates "just" results
in individual cases. 129 Narrow precedent decisions may therefore be more
likely to reflect the judges' personal biases than will broader decisions. And
judges may be more likely to favor local litigants over outsiders.
We have probably done an injustice to Baxter by concentrating on his
comparative-impairment analysis without taking fair account of the second
half of his article. 130 He indicated early in the article that he regarded that
half as the more important of his points. By way of introduction to the com-
parative-impairment discussion, he wrote: "Because my thesis of the role of
the federal courts in conflicts cases depends in substantial part on my view of
the governmental interest analysis, an exposition of that view is neces-
sary."' 3 ' His thesis that the federal courts should play a major role in con-
flicts cases is developed in a painstaking analysis of text, legislative history
(constitutional and statutory), and precedent. He introduced this thesis by
saying that it "seems unsound" to place in the hands of the state courts exten-
sive responsibility for deciding when their "policies will yield to and when
they will prevail over the competing policies of sister states.' ' 32
128. Cf Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 949, 983 (1994) (observing that courts do not care much about the choice-of-law aspects of
their decisions).
129. In an annual lecture to first-year students at Cardozo Law School, the late Charles D.
Breitel, former Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, explained that judges first approach
cases by asking themselves which party deserved to win. "Only after ascertaining where justice lies
in the individual case do judges move on to the next question: What harm to the jurisprudence will
result if I do justice in the individual case?" Id. at 995.
130. Indeed, Baxter suggested as much in his oral commentary on our presentation at the
symposium held in his honor at Stanford Law School in November 1998.
131. Baxter, supra note 4, at 6.
132. Id. at 23.
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He sought to nail down the point with an analogy: "Baseball's place as
the favorite American pastime would not long survive if the responsibilities
of the umpire were transferred to the first team member who managed to rule
on a disputed event." 133 True enough, but to borrow Baxter's analogy, some
critics believe that the extraordinary discretion disinterested umpires have to
define their own strike zones has tarnished baseball's luster. In the previous
sections, we have tried to confine our criticism of comparative impairment to
what we perceive as its failure to define the strike zone precisely enough to
constrain any umpire, interested or disinterested. That alone is relevant to
the rationality and integrity of comparative impairment as an intellectual
construct. But it is relevant to the usefulness of comparative impairment as a
practical nationwide choice-of-law regime that in the last thirty-five years
there has been no movement of the federal courts toward assuming the role
of impartial umpires and none is in prospect 134 despite Baxter's persuasive
argument. In these circumstances, if comparative impairment were univer-
sal, what we would have is interested parties calling balls and strikes and
using an ill-defined strike zone.
Take, as an example, the difficulty a judge of ordinary legal acumen
would have in distinguishing between comparative-impairment analysis and
making super-value judgments-deciding which state's law is the better law
to apply. It is "one of the cornerstones" of Baxter's article "that super-value
judgments are separable from the comparative-impairment principle."' 35
Comparative impairment, he urged, calls for an objective determination of
which state's interest would be least impaired by subordination of its law;
while a judge making a super-value judgment is deciding which law he
thinks is better normatively. But Baxter himself suggested that scholars of
the quality of Brainerd Currie and Paul Freund have confused the two. 136
Think, then, of the run-of-the-mill state court judge, lacking the analytical
skills of a Currie or a Freund. Regardless of the intellectual labelings, such a
judge is unlikely to subordinate the local normative rule to a contrary sub-
stantive law of another state.' 37
The single scant piece of empirical evidence available, too little to rely
upon alone with certainty, nevertheless potentially supports this view. Rela-
tive to interest analysis, comparative impairment might reduce forum law
133. Id.
134. Since 1963, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed its commitment to Klaxon's rule that a
federal district court is to decide a choice-of-law case just as a state court of its district would. See
Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3,4 (1975).
135. Baxter, supra note 4, at 22.
136. Seeid. at 18.
137. Baxter expressed similar concerns regarding attempts to identify normative choice crite-
ria that focus on the interests of the parties to the suit. See id. at 6.
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bias, but only by a small amount at best. 138 Recall that Baxter's multilateral
approach to true conflicts was intended to reduce the forum law bias of inter-
est analysis. The empirical investigation of this possibility yields smaller
differences than one might predict, if any, and what we have said about judi-
cial incentives helps to explain an otherwise surprising result. In short, be-
cause the comparative-impairment principle is so difficult for judges to ap-
ply, the temptations of leisure or favoritism can prevail.
V. A MODIFIED FIRSTRESTATEMENTALTERNATIVE
Baxter frequently emphasized the importance and desirability of primary
predictability, the ability of parties to predict ex ante what the legal conse-
quences will be if something goes wrong or a transaction otherwise engen-
ders a dispute or an accident happens. 139 His criticism of the First Restate-
ment rules, remember, was that "[a]s means to the end of predictability" they
were not too rigid but rather "not rigid enough. ' 140 He indicated, however,
that the fostering of primary predictability is not enough to sustain choice-of-
law rules, although his only stated reason for this conclusion was that "more
rigid choice rules easily could be but have not been devised," which strongly
suggests "that the profession has not yet concluded no objectives other than
predictability exist to be served."'141
At a later point in the article Baxter gave his response "[i]n its briefest
form" to one who would urge "a rigid and predictable system, i.e., one that is
arbitrary except as it serves the goal of primary predictability."' 42 This re-
sponse was that "the comparative-impairment principle can be applied with
conviction and predictability in a substantial majority of cases and ... the
gains in effectuation of local policies will more than offset the costs incurred
by marginal reduction of primary predictability."' 143
We have stated our reasons for believing that here, as elsewhere, Baxter
underestimated the uncertainty that resides in comparative-impairment
analysis even when undertaken in the best of faith. We have added, as a
further flaw of comparative impairment, the bias in favor of forum law that
results from the want of an impartial umpire, which magnifies secondary
138. See Thiel, supra note 73, at text accompanying n.63. Actually, Thiel never expressly
considered the effects of comparative-impairment analysis on court decisions. He did, however,
conclude that the interest analysis states, grouped together and including the outlier state of Califor-
nia, showed a pro-forum-law bias. His results were strengthened slightly when California cases
were omitted from the interest analysis group. See id. at n.63. We infer from this result that, at
most, comparative impairment only slightly reduces forum law bias relative to interest analysis.
139. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 4, at 3, 9, 20-22.
140. Id. at 3; see also text accompanying note 40 supra.
141. Id. at4.
142. Id. at 21.
143. Id. at 21-22.
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predictability at the expense of primary predictability. We believe that the
reduction in primary predictability will therefore be more than marginal.
Baxter wrote critically of attempts to find a normative basis for choice of
law that focus on "the interests of the immediate parties to the transaction"
because they lead to the necessity of making super-value judgments. 144 We
agree with this criticism. But that ex post focus on the parties is quite differ-
ent from considering the ex ante interests of persons and firms in ordering
their affairs, as Baxter of course recognized when he wrote that "few would
deny" that primary predictability "is a goal worthy of pursuit." 145
We suggest that primary predictability is not just a goal worthy of pursuit
but should be the primary goal of any system of choice-of-law rules.
Whether it should be the exclusive goal-that is, whether, if a rational sys-
tem could be devised whereby the realization of state interests in conflicts
cases could be maximized with only a minimal loss of primary predictability,
the maximization would be worth the loss-is an issue we need not take on.
All that we contend is that a "rigid and predictable system" such as Baxter
supposed, "arbitrary," perhaps, "except as it serves the goal of primary pre-
dictability," is preferable to a system that yields as much uncertainty as com-
parative impairment seems to us to yield. 146
We have no doubt that, if the parties (or their lawyers) contemplating an
interstate transaction were consulted, all of them would be much more inter-
ested in being certain about which state's law would apply in case of a dis-
pute than in whether the choice-of-law rule applied in the adjudication of the
dispute would rationally maximize the interests of states X and Y. Although,
as Baxter noted, primary predictability is more important in the kind of case
we have just supposed-a consensual arrangement-than in the case of the
unplanned personal injury accident, 147 many potential tortfeasors-such as
manufacturers of products-are well aware of governing law and can alter
their actions depending on what law is expected to be applied. And insur-
ance companies are vitally interested in what law will apply to an insured's
allegedly tortious conduct and can help the insured to plan accordingly.
Lawyers who practice across state lines, and are thus subject to discipline
and malpractice liability in several jurisdiction, are illustrative of potential
tortfeasors who would want to know what rule will govern their conduct.
144. Id. at 4-5.
145. Id. at 3.
146. As we note in the text, the parties themselves value primary predictability. We should
also add that primary predictability promotes social utility. If the parties have clearly established
legal rights, then presumably they are much better able to bargain privately and reach more efficient
outcomes. See Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 19 (1960) ("[I]f
market transactions were costless, all that matters ... is that the rights of the various parties should
be well-defined and the results of legal actions easy to forecast.").
147. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 3.
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The drafters of the American Bar Association's amended disciplinary rule
regarding choice of law thus saw a need for "relatively simple, bright line
rules"148 to enable such lawyers to know to what disciplinary rule their con-
duct must conform. The amended Rule 8.5 of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct provides simply that, if the breach of a disciplinary rule is
related to litigation in the forum, then forum rules apply so long as the law-
yer is admitted to practice in the forum state.149 In all other cases, whether
the lawyer's conduct is related to litigation or to negotiating or counseling,
the law of the state in which the lawyer is admitted to practice governs.150 If
the lawyer is admitted to practice in two or more states, then the law of the
state in which the lawyer "principally practices" governs unless "particular
conduct clearly has its predominant effect in another jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is licensed. 151
Obviously the rule leaves some room for the exercise of judgment, and a
law review symposium on the subject elicited some criticism that the rule
was not rigid enough.152 But others in the same symposium criticized the
rule as too rigid. 153 That criticism is reflected in the Restatement of the Law
Governing Lawyers recently approved by the membership of the American
Law Institute. The discussion is a model-we are tempted to say "parody"---
of the multifactored approach of the Second Restatement. The professed aim
of the restaters of the law governing lawyers is to find "the jurisdiction with
the most significant relationship to the charged offensive conduct" so that its
law can be applied. 54 Thus, the tribunal should consider a list of factors-
including, apparently, something like comparative impairment: "the nature
of the regulatory interests reflected in the different provisions in question.' ' 55
148. See ABA Comm. On Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Recommendation and Re-
port to the House of Delegates 4 (1993).
149. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(1) (1993). See generally
H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., Federalism and Choice of Law in the Regulation of Legal Ethics, 82
MINN. L. REV. 73 (1997) (discussing choice-of-law problems and the ABA's solution).
150. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(i) (1993).
151. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.5(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
152. See, e.g., Mary C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in Multyurisdictional Practice-Is
Model Rule 8.5 the Answer, an Answer, or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 715, 760-61
(1995); Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Jurisdiction, Choice of Law, and the Multistate Attorney, 36 S. TEX.
L. REV. 799, 833-37 (1995).
153. See Gregory B. Adams, Reflections on the Reaction to Proposed Rule 8.5: Consensus of
Failure, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 1101, 1105 (1995) ("[T]he ultimate failure of proposed Rule 8.5 is that
it ignores the very state interests that have created the impetus for the revision.").
154. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. h (Proposed Final
Draft 1998).
155. The list of factors also includes "the nature of the charged offense; the nature of the law-
yer's work; the impact of the questioned conduct on the interests of third persons and on public
institutions such as tribunals, administrative agencies, or legislative bodies; the residence and place
of business of any client or third person whose interests are materially affected by the lawyer's
actions; and the place where the affected conduct occurred." Id.
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In the end, say the restaters, there can be "no more specific formula" than
what they have set forth, "and each issue of conflict must be addressed on its
specific facts."156
It is perhaps unfair to contrast the relative rigidity of the ABA rule with
an approach that Baxter himself would have undoubtedly eschewed. But our
fear is that the search for which state's interest is least impaired is about as
uncertain of outcome as the search for the state with the most significant re-
lationship. And lawyers cannot be the only potential defendants who desire a
rule more than they concern themselves with its content.
In support of his comparative-impairment principle, Baxter wrote that,
"[i]n deciding whether real conflicts issues ought to be resolved by applica-
tion of the suggested standard, the relevant question cannot be 'Will such
application resolve the issues infallibly?' Rather the question is 'Which is
the most satisfactory of alternative modes of resolution?"'1 57 Precisely so:
Beware the "nirvana fallacy."158 All of us tend to be too eager to reject a
solution when we identify one of its shortcomings. However, given that
every solution is bound to have some shortcomings, the critical policy ques-
tion is, indeed, the one Baxter so cogently stated.
In fact, Baxter's call for the incorporation of this and other law and eco-
nomics principles into the choice-of-law issue leads us to the conclusion that
the widespread rejection of the First Restatement rules was a classic illustra-
tion of the "nirvana fallacy" at work. Baxter identified the correct approach.
Here, as well as everywhere else, decisions must be made with reference to
the costs and benefits of alternative solutions. Applying those principles, we
believe that a modified First Restatement approach is the preferred alterna-
tive.
In the process of academic vilification of the First Restatement, the
practical virtues of its rules were typically ignored, and they remain un-
derappreciated. No doubt there were hard cases under the First Restatement,
for, almost by necessity, rules tend to be either over- or under-inclusive.
However, despite its lack of theoretical justification, the First Restatement
rules reached sound results in the large majority of cases. As Richard Posner
has noted, the place of injury rule for torts tended to enable each state to ex-
ercise its comparative regulatory advantage.1 59 To the extent that differing
environments across the states lead to differing substantive rules, each law
156. Id.
157. Baxter, supra note 4, at 19.
158. See Steams, supra note 122, at 1229-30 (discussing intellectual flaw in comparing real
world institutions with ideal, and therefore non-existent, ones); see also Coase, supra note 158, at
43 (warning that analysis of "ideal world" scenarios may be largely irrelevant); Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1-4 (1969) (noting inferior
policy proposals that result from nirvana reasoning).
159. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 646.
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should be applied in that environment for which it is optimal. For example,
rural states may adopt a standard of driver care toward pedestrians different
from that adopted by urban states, and the difference may turn on the relative
prevalence of pedestrians or crosswalks. In the majority of cases, the defen-
dant's negligent behavior takes place in the same state as the plaintiffs in-
jury, and the laws in that state are presumably at least intended to suit the
specific environment. And, even if the defendant acted in another state than
the one where the plaintiff was injured, a defendant who is aware that his
conduct has effects in another state (and therefore in another environment)
should, to the extent possible, tailor his conduct to suit both environments. A
place of injury rule therefore tended to create the right incentives for care.
Of course, as Currie and others pointed out, sometimes the place of in-
jury rule seemed inappropriate. Baxter, as we have seen, distinguished be-
tween conduct-regulating and loss-distribution rules. 160 Guest statutes and
intrafamily immunity rules presumably focus more on how losses will be
distributed than they do on creating incentives for care. When a Colorado
wife sues her Colorado husband for negligently inflicted injuries that she
suffered in Texas, perhaps Colorado has a much greater interest in the hus-
band's (and therefore the insurance company's) liability than does Texas. In
this situation, the place of injury rule appears inapt. Unfortunately, however,
we have difficulty knowing the extent to which Texas bundles its tort laws.
In order to prevent abuse, Texas might have established broad rights of re-
covery but narrow categories of people who can take advantage of those
rights. And Colorado might allow everyone to recover for negligently in-
flicted injuries but lower the standard of care. The First Restatement at least
eliminated the depecage problem that inevitably arises from efforts to distin-
guish these two types of tort rules. Even if the distinction seems appropriate,
however, the First Restatement could be modified to include a common
domicile rule for "loss distribution" rules while retaining a "place of injury"
rule for those laws directed toward conduct.
The place of contracting rule also made sense most of the time. Despite
the humorous hypotheticals of law professors that cast doubt on the subrule
that a contract is concluded when an acceptance is placed in the mailbox, 161
the place of contracting rule tended to promote primary predictability and
protect justified expectations. Suppose, for example, that North Dakota pro-
tects its spendthrifts and their families by permitting any guardian of a court-
adjudged spendthrift to void the spendthrift's contracts. Suppose further that
South Dakota provides no spendthrift protections. S, a North Dakota spend-
thrift, purchases a car from R, a South Dakota retailer. Is S's contract with R
voidable? Under the First Restatement, it depends on where the contract was
160. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 11-12; see also text accompanying note 123 supra.
161. Whatever else, any twenty-first century revision of the First Restatement rules would
have to take account of today's express mail services, fax machines, and e-mail.
1044 [Vol. 51:1011
HeinOnline  -- 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1044 1998-1999
CONFLICT OF LA WS
formed. If S went into South Dakota to buy the car, then S would receive no
protection because the contract was formed in the place to which he traveled.
If instead R traveled into North Dakota to entice sales there, then R's contract
would typically be subject to North Dakota's protection of spendthrifts.
The place of contracting rule tends to protect justified expectations.
When R does business in his own state, he is entitled to rely on the protec-
tions afforded by home state laws. If he instead chooses to do business else-
where, he is subject to the laws of another state. Baxter and others criticized
the protection of party expectations as insufficient to justify the rules. No
doubt they were correct that individuals learn to expect whatever the gov-
erning laws indicate that they should expect. But the maxim "when in Rome
.. " is so widespread an expectation built on a wellspring of governing rules
and social norms that any other treatment of the problem seems counterintui-
tive to the average lay person. Contrary to Baxter's witticism, 162 then, it does
not take law training to make one think it somehow right that a contract is
governed by the law of the place where it was made.
Baxter might respond that our criticism is unfair. After all, he repeatedly
resolves the hypotheticals in his article by reference to justified party expec-
tations. Thus, in his hands, comparative impairment works in favor of pri-
mary predictability. As we have already argued, however, in the hands of
judges, comparative impairment more likely results in a bias in favor of fo-
rum law or local residents. This is a classic illustration of the "rules versus
standards" debate prevalent throughout law,163 and for reasons that we have
already articulated, we believe that the unconstraining standard, difficult to
administer and susceptible to manipulation, is best replaced by even an im-
perfect rule that protects the same values.
Primary predictability is perhaps nowhere more essential than in con-
tracts. The value of a contract lies in the ability of each party to rely on the
other's promises, and to know the extent to which those promises are legally
enforceable. The place-of-contracting rule provided foreknowledge of which
state law would be applied to that contract. As an added bonus, the place-of-
contracting rule also enabled the parties in some cases to choose the content
of the law that would govern their contract, by contracting in a particular
chosen state.164 Of course, this ex ante tailoring might be less expensively
achieved today with a choice-of-law provision in the contract itself. None-
162. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
163. For other examples of this debate, see generally James W. Colliton, Standards, Rules
and the Decline of the Courts in the Law of Taxation, 99 DICK. L. REv. 265 (1995); Clayton P.
Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV. 181 (1996); Jo-
seph R. Grodin, Are Rules Really Better Than Standards?, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 569 (1994); Louis
Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557 (1992); and Lee E.
Teitelbaum, Youth Crime and the Choice Between Rules and Standards, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 351.
164. See O'Hara & Ribstein, supra note 81, at 769.
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theless, predictability can be enhanced in an area where ex ante knowledge
of what the governing law will be matters much more to the parties than does
the content of the governing law.
A similar argument supports the situs rule for real property issues. Pro-
fessor Baxter concedes that the situs state has the greatest interest in land use
issues, 165 and, clearly, the situs state has a comparative regulatory advantage.
In resolving land title disputes, however, Baxter sees the situs state's interest
as minimal.166 Admittedly, title disputes involve personal rights, and a non-
situs state where an affected party was domiciled might well be "interested."
However, without a clear choice-of-law rule regarding these disputes, cer-
tainty of title is threatened, and the land becomes less valuable as the cost of
title insurance rises. Moreover, because title issues might well arise in the
future, the situs rule better enables potential purchasers and title insurance
companies to discern the rights of others ex ante.
Furthermore, title issues often involve matters important to the situs
state. Rules regarding testamentary disposition and future contingencies are
rarely adopted arbitrarily merely to provide clarity of title. Instead, they rep-
resent a delicate balance between concerns for the grantor and his assigns on
the one hand, and policy concerns directed toward facilitating future property
use on the other. Bundled together, these rules regarding title help ensure the
future alienability of property and prevent its excessive fragmentation. 167
And, as we have already noted, breaking that bundle apart can easily create
unintended, adverse consequences.
We must emphasize that Baxter's insights lead us to a modified First Re-
statement approach. Some rules have clearly not worked well in practice and
should be modified or replaced. Baxter has provided some insightful illus-
trations of how better to incorporate important principles into the process of
formulating rules, and, no doubt, a set of modified rules should reflect his
concerns. For example, some commentators have suggested a place-of-sale
rule for products liability 6 because it better enables manufacturers to target
their products to states with compatible safety standards than does a place of
injury rule. Moreover, it prevents states with relatively high safety standards
from exporting the costs of those standards to states with lower standards.
And, of course, the proliferation of Internet products over the last few years
has created a plethora of choice-of-law complications for many areas, in-
165. See Baxter, supra note 4, at 16 ("Persons who live in the vicinity of the property are the
intended beneficiaries of many property laws, such as the laws of nuisance, and the location of the
property... often should control the applicability of those laws.").
166. See id. ("But as to competing claims of ownership, situs is not a reliable choice crite-
rion.").
167. See generally Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Properly, 108 YALE L.J.
(forthcoming 1999) (noting that American property law contains a diverse set of restraints against
fragmentation to protect alienability).
168. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 85, at 98-99; Solimine, supra note 73, at 89-90 (1989).
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eluding contracts, torts, and criminal law.169 These and other issues indicate
that a careful rethinking of the details of the First Restatement rules is long
overdue. But, in the end, the primary predictability that rigid rules foster
creates benefits that far outweigh those of a difficult, standards-based, judi-
cial inquiry. Given the constraints, the traditional choice-of-law rules are far
from empty, and they promote neutral decisionmaking, and thus, perhaps,
they are optimally bloodless.
To be honest, the ambiguities and uncertainties we described in Part I,
many of which are necessarily embedded within the traditional approach,
reduce both primary and secondary predictability relative to the ideal, per-
fectly unambiguous rules we appear to hypothesize. However, relative to the
modem interest analysis-based alternatives, the traditional approach appears,
in fact, to generate smaller biases in decisionmaking. Despite Baxter's ad-
monitions, conflicts scholars fell prey to the same intellectual error that per-
vaded the transition from legal realism to critical legal studies: the idea that,
since we can never perfectly constrain judicial decisionmaking, we should
not even try. Unfortunately, we are beginning to suffer the consequences of
that error. 70 To paraphrase again one of the influential conflicts scholars of
this century: Beware the nirvana fallacy.
CONCLUSION
Participants in the symposium at which the substance of this article was
presented orally suggested that the significance of choice of law has dwin-
dled. The issues engage the courts only infrequently, and conflict of laws
goes untaught in some of the most prestigious law schools, including Stan-
ford. Parties to consensual transactions have learned to specify what law will
govern their agreements, and the parties' choice is honored to a greater ex-
169. See generally Christopher P. Beall, The Scientological Defenestration of Choice-of-Law
Doctrines for Publication Torts on the Internet, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 361
(1997) (discussing the problems presented by different states' quite different libel laws and how
choice of law can be dispositive); Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in
Transnational Cyberspace, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996) (discussing forum selection
clauses and admiralty principles as useful tools); Aron Mefford, Lex Informatica: Foundations of
Law on the Internet, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 211 (1997) (discussing the possibility of the
development of private cyberlaw as a new lex mercatoria).
170. See Francis A. Gabor, Stepchild of the New Lex Mercatoria: Private International Law
From the United States Perspective, 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 538, 540-41 (1988) (suggesting
unsettled, non-uniform laws within the United States interfere with our international trade pros-
pects); Christopher L. Ingrim, Choice-of-Law Clauses: Their Effect on Extraterritorial Analysis-A
Scholar's Dream, A Practitioner's Nightmare, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 663, 677 (1995) (discussing
the importance of "orderliness" and "predictability" in international business and problems created
by choice-of-law uncertainties); Gene R. Shreve, Choice of Law and the Forgiving Constitution, 71
IND. L.J. 271, 271 (1996) ("[Clonflicts localism unfairly damages nonforum litigants, exhibits dis-
respect to nonforum governments, and undermines principles of order and uniformity in choice of
law.").
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tent than once was the case. 171 Or, if a choice-of-law issue lurks, it is often
ignored. The law of torts is more homogeneous across the nation than was
true during the revolution in American conflicts law, and supreme federal
law increasingly governs what were once issues purely of state law.172 Nev-
ertheless, choice-of-law issues must still be resolved even if only sometimes,
and it remains important, as Bill Baxter thought it was in 1963, that they be
resolved rationally. It is in that spirit that we have undertaken this article.
Although we have no illusion that this article will have the impact of
Baxter's original article, both of us have profited from the undertaking. For
one of us, the profit lay principally in the chance to renew intellectual ac-
quaintanceship, though from afar, with an old friend-he and Bill Baxter
were law school classmates, young associates in the same law firm, and
even, very briefly, colleagues on the Stanford Law School faculty. As a re-
sult of that association, this author held for Bill Baxter affection and an ad-
miration that approached awe. For the other one of us, the profit lay in the
opportunity to think about a law and economics approach to choice of law,
and to discover that she, a green conflicts scholar, cannot ultimately improve
upon Bill Baxter's principles. He was, without a doubt, a man much ahead
of his own time.
171. See Symeonides, supra note 49, at 273 ("The vast majority of [contract cases in which
the contract contains a choice-of-law clause] routinely uphold such clauses, often without much
discussion.").
172. Displaying a catholicity of interest in the law that continued until the end, Baxter him-
self, commenting on the oral presentation of this article at the symposium in his honor, mentioned
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996), a dispute over the legality of a credit-
card late fee. The fee was valid in the state of the card-issuing bank, but not in the state of the card-
holder. But what might have been a nice question of comparative impairment was held to turn on
federal law: A regulation under the National Bank Act provided that a national bank could legally
charge interest at a rate allowed by the state in which it was located. See id. at 739-44; see also
Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)
(national bank entitled, under federal law, to charge interest rates permissible in home state);
Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1992) (state chartered bank insured
by FDIC entitled, under federal law, to charge late fees permitted by home state).
1048 [Vol. 51:1011
HeinOnline  -- 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1048 1998-1999
